Does accounting treatment of share-based payments impact performance measures for banks? by Alhaj Ismail, Alaa et al.
 
Does accounting treatment of share-based payments impact performance 
measures for banks? 
 
Summary at a glance 
This paper evaluates the resulting impact of mandatory expensing of Share-Based 
Compensation (SBC) under IFRS2/FASB123R on a set of widely used performance 
measures in the EU and US banking industry. The findings show that the impact seems to be 
material, yet modest, for US banks and only for large and high growth EU banks. Banks also 
continue to use SBC but there is a reduction, albeit insignificant, in the recognised SBC 





This paper identifies, evaluates, and analyses the resulting impact of mandatory expensing of 
Share-Based Compensation (SBC) under IFRS2/FASB123R on a set of widely used 
performance measures in the EU and US banking industry. The paper shows that the 
accounting treatment of SBC schemes, following the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R, has a statistically significant negative impact on the selected performance 
measures over the period 2004-2011. The impact also seems to be material, yet modest, for 
US banks and only for large and high growth EU banks, indicating that earlier public 
concerns and criticisms of the implementation of IFRS2/FAS123R are largely 
unsubstantiated. The findings also show that banks continue to use SBC, but there is a 
reduction, albeit insignificant, in the recognised SBC expense over the period 2009-2011. 
That is, earlier public concerns that firms would curtail employing SBC in their employees’ 
compensation schemes to avoid the effect of SBC expense recognition on their financial 
ratios came to light after the first option life-cycle in the post-adoption period was over. The 
findings also show a marked movement towards using cash-settled based payments, possibly 
due to their manipulative accounting treatment, a potentially interesting issue for related 
accounting research and accounting standard-setters. 
 













Share-Based Compensation [SBC], particularly employee share options1, has expanded 
significantly since the late 1990s in the US (Murphy, 1999; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2009) 
and since early 2000 in the EU (Pendleton et al, 2002; European Commission, 2003). One of 
the main reasons for the widespread use of SBC packages was directly linked to the lax 
accounting treatment of employee share options in the US (Botosan and Plumlee, 2001) and 
worldwide (Coulton and Taylor, 2002a; Street and Cereola, 2004; Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 
2010). Prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R (Share-based Payments), the cost 
of employee share options was overwhelmingly disclosed in the footnotes2 but not recognised 
in the financial statements of firms. In 2004 and as a response to the most prolonged and 
controversial debate in the history of accounting standard setting (Johnston, 2006, p.399; 
Farber et al., 2007), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International 
Accounting Standard Boards (IASB) issued FAS123R  and IFRS2 (Share-Based Payments), 
respectively.3 Under the newly introduced accounting regime, all SBC schemes4 must be 
recognised as an expense at the fair value, at the grant date, spread over the vesting period.  
 
The IASB/FASB argument to support the mandatory expensing of SBC is that, if SBC 
expense is not recognised in the income statement, the financial statements will provide 
ultimately overstated and distorted reported earnings that do not faithfully reflect the 
underlying economic reality or a ‘true and fair’ view of companies’ financial positions. 
Prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, it was argued that expensing SBC 
would have a material impact on the reported financial performance of companies, causing a 
deterioration in a variety of performance measures (see Ratliff, 2005). This argument was, 
indeed, supported by several studies that mainly examined the US (Botosan and Plumlee, 
2001) and Australian contexts (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005). These supporting studies took 
advantage of data availability of pro-forma disclosure prior to the mandatory recognition 
regime. Additional concerns have also been raised regarding employees’ fear that companies 
may respond to mandatory imposition of IFRS2/FAS123R by curtailing SBC schemes in 
their employees’ compensation packages to minimise the effect of recognising SBC expense 
on their financial ratios. Since then, there have been several calls for research to “ascertain 
the impact of SBC expense recognition on a broader range of firms and for more performance 
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indicators” as data becomes available under IFRS2/FAS123R (Street and Cereola, 2004 p. 
36). 
Schroeder and Schauer (2008) and Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010) provided initial 
evidence, using post-FAS123R/IFRS2 adoption data, on the effect of expensing SBC 
schemes on firms’ performance measures in the US and UK contexts, respectively. Yet, the 
sample period of these studies focused only on the first two years of FAS123R/IFRS2 
adoption. Earlier related studies, such as those conducted by Botosan and Plumlee (2001, 
p.325) and Chalmers and Godfrey (2005), necessitate the need to conduct relevant research 
over a longer time-span, where the effect of expensing SBC schemes might “become even 
more economically significant in the near future, potentially doubling over the next three to 
five years”, the period usually required to complete the option life cycle. Firms issue SBC 
schemes annually, or sometimes in a longer time-span basis, and at a steady or unsteady 
level; the associated recognised expense of SBC schemes is thus expected to increase 
gradually over the early years of IFRS2/FAS123R until it becomes, to some extent, stabilised 
once the life cycle of the first options granted after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R is over5. Moreover, the short time-span, not covering the option life cycle, 
might have also driven the discrepancy in estimating the total effect of expensing SBC on 
firms’ financial performance measures.6  
This paper identifies, evaluates, and analyses the total impact of mandatory expensing of 
SBC schemes over a relatively long period of time (2005-2011)7 on a set of widely used 
performance measures for a sample of EU and US banks. Moreover, in this study, we 
consider all types of share-based payments granted to employees at different levels, including 
executives.  
The EU and the US are internationally active and peer markets that first adopted this standard 
and the use of SBC is a common practice in their employees’ compensation packages. The 
banking sectors in the EU and US markets are chosen for the purpose of this paper for the 
following reasons. The use of SBC schemes has become widespread in the banking industry 
over the last two decades (Chen at al., 2006; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). SBC schemes 
provide incentives for managers to engage in risk-taking activities. This has been shown to be 
of particular importance for the banking sector (Chen et al., 2006; Walker, 2009). The 
significant growth in SBC schemes over these two decades has also been one of the main 
reasons for the recent capital regulation in banking industry8 (Mehran and Rosenberg, 2009). 
Focusing on the banking sector for the purpose of this paper also responds to the lack of and 
the need for additional studies on SBC schemes in the banking sector highlighted by earlier 
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studies, such as Mehran and Rosenberg (2009).  Finally, the homogeneity of the banking 
industry9 provides a stronger setting to control for industry-specific confounding factors.  
The findings of this descriptive research suggest that the impact of SBC expense on the 
selected performance measures, ROE, ROA, EPS and cost to income ratio, is statistically 
negative. This impact is material, yet modest, for US banks and only for large and high 
growth EU banks, indicating earlier public concerns and criticisms of the implementation of 
this standard are largely unsubstantiated. Moreover, the results show that the earlier 
predictions and employees’ fears that firms would curtail SBC schemes to avoid or reduce the 
mandatorily associated expense came to light after the first option cycle in the post-adoption 
period was over. Specifically, while banks continue to use SBC, we find a reduction, albeit 
insignificant, in the recognised SBC expense relative to staff expenses over the period 2009-
2011. Finally, the trend of using cash-settled based payments is marked, possibly due to the 
issue of accounting manipulation, a potential interesting issue for related accounting research 
and accounting standard-setters.  
The remainder of this paper is subsequently structured as follows. Section 2 reviews earlier 
related studies. The sample selection and data collection as well as the employed methods are 
explained in section 3. Section 4 discusses the descriptive characteristics of the sampled 
banks in this paper. Sections 5 evaluates the impact of recognising SBC expense on the 
selected performance indicators, and Section 6 analyses the statistical impact of recognising 
SBC expense on these financial indicators pooled together and using different sets of control. 
Finally, Section 7 draws conclusions and inferences from the paper’s findings and suggests 
areas to be addressed in future research. 
2. Literature review 
Previous accounting literature has utilised several approaches to examine the large increase in 
the use of SBC and its impact on firms’ market valuation and financial reporting. For 
example, Carlin and Ford (2006, p. 78) in their study of large listed Australian companies 
(from 1997-2002) highlighted that the use of share options compensation packages for 
directors and executives had ‘grown substantially’ and analysed this growth from a 
governance perspective. They pointed to increasing evidence that share options schemes were 
being ‘associated with a range of dubious behaviour on the part of executives’ (ibid. p78). 
Indeed, Carlin and Ford conclude that it is not only important to consider the need for 
‘careful design of incentive contracts’ but also to keep a ‘careful watch’ on the dispersion or 
concentration of option-based remuneration packages. Brown and Yew (2002), Aboody et al., 
(2004) and Niu and Xu (2009), among others,have focused on the association between SBC 
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expense and market values under alternative accounting treatments. These studies typically 
conclude that incentive effects of SBC are dominant in firm valuation. Earlier accounting 
literature has also discussed the detrimental effects on firms’ competitiveness and innovation 
as firms might reduce issuing SBC schemes to avoid decreases in their net income and other 
related financial performance under the mandatory recognition approach to SBC expense 
(See Ratliff, 2005).  
This paper focuses mainly on the impact of SBC expense on selected financial indicators of 
reporting entities. The following two subsections, therefore, survey prior studies that 
investigated the impact of expensing SOBC on companies reported earnings and other related 
financial indicators prior and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. 
2.1 Evidence of impact of IFRS2/FAS123R using pre-adoption data 
Related studies conducted before the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, provided evidence 
supporting the notion that, if the fair value of SBC schemes was treated as an expense, many 
financial performance indicators would be significantly deteriorated. For instance, Botosan 
and Plumlee (2001) utilised the pro-forma disclosure on employee stock options for a sample 
of the top 100 highest earning growth US companies in 1999; the results of their descriptive 
research show that the mean (median) reduction in diluted EPS and ROA due to stock option 
expensing would be 22.9% (14%) and 22.8% (13.6%), respectively. They also predicted 
doubling of the magnitude of this effect over the following three to five years.  
Street and Cereola (2004) further extended Botosan and Plumlee’s work by comparing the 
likely effect of expensing SBC schemes at an international level. Their sample includes 291 
non-domestic companies listed in the US but domiciled in other countries. Their findings 
reveal that the mean (median) reduction in diluted EPS if stock options were expensed in the 
year ended December 31, 2000, would be 41.19% (6.29%).10 They also reported that the 
average pro-forma stock options expense expressed as a percentage of opening stockholder’s 
equity is 14.96%, and the average reduction in net income due to stock option expensing is 
38.95%. Their results also indicate that the effect of expensing SBC schemes on the selected 
firms’ performance measures varies significantly across countries.  
Chalmers and Godfrey (2005) examined the impact of expensing SBC granted to directors 
and the five most senior executives, on ROA, ROE, and diluted EPS of 159 Australian firms. 
They assumed that the vesting period of granted options is three years and the options are 
granted for the first time on 1 January 2002. They documented that the initial (first year) 
mean (median) reduction in ROA, ROE and diluted EPS, if firms started to recognise SBC 
expense in 2002, would be 3.76 % (0.34%), 13.63% (0.41 %) and 13.67% (0.40%), 
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respectively. However, once the option cycle was completed and the associated expense had 
stabilised after three years, the mean (median) reduction in ROA, ROE and, diluted EPS 
would increase to 11.29% (1.01%), 40.89% (1.22%) and 41% (1.21%), respectively.  
2.2 Evidence of impact of IFRS2/FAS123R using post adoption data: 
Subsequent to the mandatory adoption of the IFRS2/FAS123R in 2004, there have been, as 
far as we are aware, only two studies that examined the post-adoption effect of 
IFRS2/FAS123R on firms’ financial indicators. The first study was conducted by Schroeder 
and Schauer (2008). They examined the actual effect of expensing SBC schemes for a sample 
of 90 US firms with fiscal year-end on 30 June 2006. Their findings suggest that expensing 
SBC schemes in the first year of the mandatory adoption of FAS123R does not result in a 
material effect on companies’ total revenues.  Schroeder and Schauer (2008) also reported 
that the weighted average effect on net income (loss) due to SBC expensing was material, 
15.91% (33.55%). Pointedly, they claim that the effect of SFAS123R tended to be more 
material for smaller sized companies.11  
Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010) examined the impact of IFRS2 adoption on a set of selected 
performance measures for a sample of 266 UK firms over the period 2004 to 2006, where 
2004 falls before the adoption and 2005 and 2006 fall afterwards.  Their findings reveal that 
the effect of IFRS2 in the UK is only modest. They reported, in 2004, the mean (median) 
reduction in ROA, ROE, EPS due to expensing of SBC schemes was not material at the 5% 
significance level. However, in 2005 and 2006, the reduction in the selected performance 
measures as a result of expensing SBC schemes was slightly above 5%, implying a modest 
impact. Shiwakoti and Rutherford (ibid) reported that the impact varies across sectors; and it 
is slightly higher for the larger sized and more rapidly growing firms. 
Seethamraju and Zach (2003) argue that companies may respond to IFRS2/FAS123R by 
reducing SBC schemes to avoid the negative effect of the recognised SBC expense on their 
financial ratios. Indeed, following the transition from the voluntary to the mandatory 
approach for expensing SBC under FAS12R, US firms reduced the proportion of stock 
options to executives’ total compensation (Brown and Lee, 2011), and the number of options 
granted across all levels of rank and file employees (Choudhary, 2008). 
The existing literature provides insight into the reduction in firms’ performance measures as a 
result of the mandatory adoption of FAS123R/IFRS2, yet with a wide range in the reported 
reduction as identified above. Overestimated or underestimated results could be driven by 
several factors that might explain this variation in the reported reduction. First, 
IFRS2/FAS123R applies not only to stock options but also to other types of share-based 
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payments, such as share appreciation rights, granted to all employees (i.e., not only the top 
executives). Second, the variation in the time-span covered in earlier studies also might 
influence the magnitude of the reduction in firms’ selected performance measures. While 
most of earlier related studies focused on one-year data to estimate the average effect of SBC 
expensing on selected performance measures, Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010) covered three 
years [2004-206], including two years that fall in the post IFRS2 regime [2005-2006].  To 
capture the likely impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected performance measures, at least a 
three to five-year sample period is warranted (Botosan and Plumlee, 2001). This is the period 
usually required to complete the life cycle of the first options granted after IFRS2/FAS123R 
and after which SBC expense will stop gradually increasing and is more likely to stabilise, 
assuming firms grant SBC steadily on an annual basis. Third, the sample in the majority of 
related studies conducted before the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R were limited to 
the voluntarily disclosed data when carrying out their analysis. This may result in a selection 
bias in their studies as firms that choose to adopt accounting standards voluntarily may have 
innate characteristics affecting their adoption decision, and they might seek to achieve some 
hypothesised economic consequences (Sodestrom and Sun, 2007). 
3. Method and sampling 
3.1 Methods 
All the performance measures utilised in earlier studies, [ROE] (Chalmers and Godfrey, 
2005), [ROA, Diluted EPS] (Botosan and Plumlee, 2001), [SBC expense relative to opening 
shareholders’ equity] (Street and Cereola, 2004), [profit (loss) before tax] (Schroeder and 
Schauer, 2008) in addition to a widely used performance measure in banking industry (cost to 
income ratio [CIR])12, have been employed in this paper. All the selected performance 
measures are calculated with and without SBC expense. The effect of SBC expense on a 
measure in percentage is calculated as follows: ratio adjusted for SBC expense (i.e., the 
selected ratio is calculated after deducting SBC expense) minus reported ratio, and the 
difference is divided by the reported ratio. The effect of the IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected 
financial performance measures is assessed by utilising the materiality thresholds used in 
prior research and materiality statistical tests.  Differentiating between statistical and practical 
significance is a matter of importance. Small numerical differences measured in percentage 
terms can be regarded as statistically significant, yet these differences might be immaterial 
from a practical standpoint.  
 
Following previous literature, we use the 5% materiality threshold to assess the impact of 
expensing SBC on ROA, ROE, Diluted EPS, while the corresponding materiality thresholds 
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to test the impact on opening shareholders’ equity and the cost to income ratio are 0.5% and 
2%, respectively.13 To investigate the significance of the effect of SBC expensing under 
IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected performance measures statistically, we use the non-
parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (U) test/Wilcoxon signed-rank (WSR) test along with 
their comparable parametric T test for robustness check. These tests allow us to examine 
whether the effect of expensing SBC on the selected performance measures is statistically 
significant and whether the median and the mean of this effect significantly vary between EU 
and US banks. To complement our analysis, we use the Kruskal–Wallis test along with the 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) as a robustness check to examine whether the effect 
of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected performance measures significantly varies within each 
block of EU and US banks after controlling for some bank-specific characteristics (size, 
opportunity growth rate, and the variation in banking activities/structure). All figures are 
reported in US currency ($) using the exchange rate at each closing period.  
3.2 Sampling and data collection 
The data on the recognised expense of SBC schemes is hand-collected from the published 
annual reports of a sample of listed Commercial Banks (CBs) and Bank-holding Companies 
(BHCs) in the EU and US.14 The sample banks, in addition to accounting and market 
variables over the period 2004-201115, are extracted from the BankScope database.  
Banks included in our data set are required to satisfy certain criteria. First, the average assets 
of banks over the study period should be over $500 million.16 Second, for US banks, they 
should be constituents of the S&P Composite 1500. This resulted in a sample of 90 BHCs 
and 1 CBs. To increase the representation of US commercial banks in our sample, 19 banks 
classified as listed US commercial banks (not listed in the S&P 1500 but elsewhere in the 
US) in the BankScope database and with over $500 million on average total assets over the 
selected period, were added to our sample. This yields an initial sample of 90 BHCs and 20 
CBs listed in the US, as well as 28 BHCs and 58 CBs listed in the EU.  
To filter out BHCs that are not mainly engaged in traditional banking activities (i.e., deposit 
taking and loan making activities), EU and US BHCs should have more than 25% net loan to 
total assets on average over the study period to be included in our sample. For EU listed 
banks, they should also have published their annual reports in English. Furthermore, banks 
should have incorporated the expensing of SBC in their annual reports for at least three years 
over the study period.17 Finally, banks should have the required accounting and financial 
market data in the BankScope database over the study period. Table (1) summarises the final 
sample of 100 BHCs and 45 CBs of which 13 BHCs and 30 CBs are listed in the EU. This 
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final sample produces a total of 1,010 bank-year observations of which 308 are from EU 
banks. Table (1, panel B) also shows that around 60% of our EU bank-year observations 
(i.e.,180 out of 308 observations) are obtained from banks listed in the UK, Italy, Germany, 
France, Netherland, and Spain. 
Insert Table 1: Sample selection, countries and observations 
4. Descriptive statistics 
Table (2) identifies the descriptive characteristics of the sampled banks. It highlights various 
proxies of size, such as market value, total assets, opening value of shareholders’ equity, and 
employee numbers. The banks included in the sample vary in size. The average total assets of 
banks in our sample is $277 billion. The average market capitalisation over the study period 
is $14.6 billion ($27.4 billion and $8.8 billion for EU and US banks, respectively).  
Insert Table (2): Descriptive statistics. 
Table (2) shows that the average recognised expense of SBC schemes in EU and US banks 
over the study period is $166.1 million and $87.1 million, respectively, with a median of 
$13.9 million and $3.7 million, respectively. Because of the size differences, the larger 
absolute recognised expense of SBC schemes in EU banks does not necessarily mean that 
they use SBC schemes more than US banks. The ratio of SBC expense relative to staff costs 
indicates that US banks seem to use SBC schemes in their employees’ compensation 
packages more than twice as much as that used in EU banks. The mean (median) of SBC 
expense relative to staff costs over the studied period is 4.5% (3.2%) for US banks compared 
to 1.9% (1.3%) for EU banks. As a further analysis, we express in Table (3) the recognised 
expense of SBC schemes as a percentage of several variables used in prior studies (Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2001; Street and Cereola, 2004; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005; Schroeder and 
Schauer, 2008; Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 2010).  
Insert Table (3): SBC expense relative to selected key variables. 
Table (3) shows that the mean (median) of recognised SBC expense represents 0.05% 
(0.03%) of banks’ total assets over the sample period [0.02% (0.01%) and 0.06% (0.04%) for 
EU and US banks, respectively]. That is, the recognised expense of SBC schemes relative to 
banks’ total assets is immaterial using the materiality threshold of 0.5% suggested in prior 
studies (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005; Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 2010). Again, this 
descriptive evidence suggests that US banks use SBC schemes more than EU banks.  
Table (3) also shows that mean (median) of SBC expense represents on average 5.13% 
(2.76%) of pre-tax profit18 and 7.98% (3.36%) of pre-tax loss19 reported in our selected 
9 
 
sample over the study period.20 It also shows that average percentage of SBC expense on pre-
tax profits slightly exceeds the 5% materiality level for US banks [6.12%] and falls below the 
materiality level for EU banks [3.02%]. This suggests that the ratio of SBC expense relative 
to pre-tax profit is twofold in the US compared to that in the EU.  
In terms of the average recognised SBC expense relative to pre-tax loss, it is material in both 
regions (6.22% and 8.57 % for EU and US banks, respectively). These statistics are in line 
with those of Schroeder and Schauer (2008), who documented that companies reporting net 
losses had material amount of SBC expense. That is, the average recognised SBC expense 
relative to pre-tax loss appear to be higher than the corresponding percentage using pre-tax 
profit. Finally, table (3) shows that the mean (median) of recognised expense of SBC 
schemes represents 0.61% (42%) of our selected banks’ opening shareholders’ equity over 
the study period. It also shows the mean slightly exceeds the 0.5% materiality level for EU 
and US banks [0.51% and 0.66%, for EU and US banks, respectively].  
5. Impact of option expensing on ROE, Diluted EPS, and CIR 
Table (4) presents the effect of the mandatory recognition of SBC expense under 
IFRS2/FAS123R on each of the following selected performance measures, the ROE, Diluted 
EPS,21 and CIR over the period under study, along with the magnitude of SBC expense 
relative to opening shareholders’ equity.  
Insert Table 4: (A)(B)(C): The effect of expensing SBC schemes on selected financial measures in EU 
and US 
Table 4 (A) shows the average impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R on the 
selected performance measures over the post-IFRS2 adoption period for EU and US banks. 
The average impact falls a little below the corresponding materiality thresholds for ROE, 
DEPS, and CIR, while it is around the materiality thresholds for SBC expense as a percentage 
of opening shareholders’ equity. Table 4 (A) also shows that the average impact of FAS123R 
for US banks falls above the materiality thresholds for all the selected performance measures, 
and its magnitude is more than twice of that in the EU sample.  
Table 4 (B) (C) shows that, except for CIR in EU, the impact of expensing SBC schemes on 
the selected performance measures in the pre-adoption period (2004 for the EU sample and 
2005 for the US sample) is greater than that in the first year of IFRS2/FAS123R adoption 
(2005 for the EU sample and 2006 for the US sample). The reason for such a trend could be 
that banks accelerated the vesting conditions of SBC schemes to avoid recognising the 
associated expense of standing unvested grants using the fair value approach in the first-year 
of adoption (Choudhary et al., 2009).22 Table 4 (B) also shows, until 2008, the impact of 
expensing SBC schemes on the selected performance measure for EU banks are less than 
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their corresponding materiality thresholds, indicating immaterial impact on the performance 
indicators under investigation. However, this impact in 2009 slightly exceeds the materiality 
level in the EU sample (5.09%, 6.60% and 0.55% for ROE, Diluted EPS and SBC expense 
relative to opening shareholder equity, respectively), indicating a modest effect over this year 
on the selected performance indicators. In the US sample, the average effect of expensing 
SBC schemes on ROE (14.4%) and Diluted EPS (11.79%) is also slightly higher in 2009 
compared to that in previous years. This position (with a gradually increasing effect) can be 
due to the settlement that took place at the end period of the option life cycle, which usually 
takes from three to five years if a bank issue SBC schemes annually (Botosan and Plumlee, 
2001). 
However, the effect of SBC expense did not stabilise afterwards. Rather, it decreased 
dramatically in 2010 compared to that in 2009 in both samples with the exception of CIR in 
EU banks. This evidence is consistent with earlier predictions (e.g., Seethamraju and Zach, 
2003) that companies may respond to mandatory imposition of IFRS2/FAS123R by 
curtailing SBC schemes to avoid the effect of SBC expense recognition on their financial 
ratios. In 2010, the impact on most of the selected performance measures returned to a level 
less than the average impact over the study period for the EU and the US banks, respectively. 
In 2011, the impact of SBC expense on the selected performance measures grew in the EU 
sample again compared with that in the other years. In the US, the impact in 2010 and 2011 
slightly went down compared to the average impact over the study period. Such a decline 
might imply the curtailment of SBC schemes by firms to avoid the effect of SBC expense 
recognition on their financial ratios starting to appear after completing the first options cycle 
in the post-adoption period. This is also apparent from the slight decline in the percentage of 
SBC expense relative to opening shareholders’ equity in 2010 and in 2011 for both samples. 
This issue is investigated in more depth in section 6 and by using statistical tests.   
6. Assessing the statistical impact of SBC expense on selected performance measures 
This section explores the significance of the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R on banks’ selected 
performance measures using statistical tests in lieu of materiality thresholds.  
Insert table (5) A: Selected performance measures with and without adjustment for SBC expense 
Insert table (5) B: The difference in the change of the selected performance measures exclusively 
due to the introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R 
Table 5 (A) shows the significance of the mean (median) differences between the selected 
reported and adjusted ratios for SBC expense using statistical tests over the pre- and post-
IFRS2/FAS123R implementation years. Both WSR and T tests suggest that all differences 
between reported and adjusted ratios are statistically significant, indicating a material 
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influence on the selected performance measures. The findings support the IASB/FASB 
argument that, if SBC expense is not recognised in the income statement, the financial 
statements will provide overstated and distorted reported earnings that did not faithfully 
reflect the underlying economic reality or a ‘true and fair’ view of companies’ financial 
positions.  
As an additional analysis, we explore how the mandatory expensing of SBC schemes affects 
the changes in the selected financial indicators, especially in the first year of 
IFRS2/FAS123R adoption. Table 5 (B) highlights the average difference in the change (∆) of 
the selected performance measures over the period, 2004-2005 for EU banks and 2005-2006 
for US banks, exclusively due to the mandatory introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R. It shows a 
reduction in the change of these measures, except when Diluted EPS falls below their related 
corresponding materiality thresholds for EU banks. For US banks, the reduction in the change 
of almost all selected performance measures falls around the materiality thresholds used in 
earlier studies, indicating a modest impact compared to that predicted by prior literature (e.g., 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2001; Street and Cereola, 2004; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005). Also, 
both T and WSR tests indicate that this reduction in the change of the selected measures is 
statistically significant.  
To further investigate the trend of SBC expense in absolute values and relative to total staff 
expenses, we divide our study period into four distinctive periods: i) Pre IFRS2/FAS123R 
adoption, 2004 and 2005 for EU and US banks, respectively; ii) pre-global financial crisis: 
from the first year of IFRS2/FAS123R adoption until 2007; iii) the global financial crisis in 
2008; iv) post-global financial crisis, 2009-2011. Specifically, a comparison between the pre-
adoption and post-adoption period, pre-adoption period and pre-global financial crisis, and 
over the three phases of the post-adoption period (i.e. pre-global financial crisis, the global 
financial crisis and post-global financial crisis) has been also conducted.  
 
Insert table (6): Comparison of SBC expense and SBC expense relative to staff expenses over the 
studied period using T and U test: 
 
The results from table (6) indicate, for both EU and US banks, the mean (median) of SBC 
expense in absolute values over the pre-adoption period [120.5(16.35) and 65.43(4.56) for 
EU and US banks, respectively] did not vary significantly from that of post-adoption period 
at the 5% level. Table (6) also shows that the changes in the mean of SBC expense in 
absolute values across the compared periods are redundant and insignificant. However, 
relative to total staff expenses, SBC expense significantly decreased for US banks when we 
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compared the pre-adoption and post-adoption period, and pre-adoption period and the pre-
crisis period, respectively, at the 5% level. This result might indicate that accelerating the 
vesting conditions of SBC schemes to avoid recognising the associated expense of standing 
unvested grants in the first-year of adoption is more apparent for US banks compared with 
that of EU banks. Table (6) also shows that a decrease, yet insignificant, in SBC expense 
relative to total staff expenses started to appear in the post crisis period (2009-2011) in both 
samples. This suggests that the full impact of the early predicted curtailment in using SBC 
schemes following the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R became apparent after the 
first option life cycle in the post-adoption period was over. That is, employees’ fear that 
companies would curtail SBC schemes subsequent to the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R started to reflect its effect on the recognised SBC expense after finishing 
the first post-adoption option life cycle. Finally, table (6) shows that SBC expense relative to 
total staff expenses significantly decreases in 2008 compared to pre-crisis period in the EU 
sample.  Interestingly, one potential reason behind this significant decrease in SBC expense 
in 2008, particularly in the EU sample could be the cash-settled based payments23 expense.  
Insert Fig.1 cash-settled based payments in EU and US banks 
Figure (1) shows that in 2008, the average cash-settled based payments expense dropped 
dramatically, particularly in the EU sample. Given the negative effect of the crisis on the 
majority of accounting and market performance indicators, this reduction might suggest that 
bank management exploited the opportunity to obtain advantages from the accounting 
requirements of the standard for cash-settled based payments. Both IFRS2 and FAS123R 
allow companies to modify the fair value determined at grant date for cash-settled grants at 
each reporting period date and on settlement. Firms can even reverse cash-settled payments 
expense recognised in previous years when the vesting conditions of corresponded cash-
settled based compensation schemes in a given year are not met or less likely to be met 
before the expiry date of these schemes. The stated SBC expense because of the reversed 
expense of cash-settled based payments in a given year could even become negative. We 
have in this paper 11 observations with negative SBC expense. This accounting flexibility in 
the standard along with the negative effect of the crisis on the given performance vesting 
conditions may have helped managers to increase the reported earnings or lessen the reported 
losses in 2008. More pointedly, banks’ management also may have modified (the earlier 
specified) onerous vesting conditions to a new more realistic basis that is easier to attain in 
the near future, more likely in 2009. This also might explain the dramatic increase in cash-
settled based expense in 2009, particularly in the EU sample. Finally, figure (1) also shows 
that banks in both samples have gradually moved towards using cash-settled based payments 
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over the study period. The mean of cash-settled based payments expense in US banks rose 
from less than $1 million in 2005 to $9 million in 2011, whereas, in EU banks, it increased 
from $9.55 million in 2004 to $18 million in 2011. One of the main reasons for such a 
movement towards cash-settled based payments, again, might be that banks can modify the 
fair value of this type of SBC schemes at each reporting period date and on settlement.  
However, for equity-settled based payments, firms are allowed to modify the fair value 
calculated at the grant date, only if the vesting conditions of option grants are non-
performance-based and they are more likely to forfeit. This seems to give banks’ managers an 
opportunity to obtain advantages from the accounting requirement of cash-settled based 
payments under IFRS2. Therefore, cash-settled based payments might be used for the 
purpose of earnings management, among other things, an issue that needs further 
consideration by IASB and other standard setters. This also suggests that a “carful watch” on 
the structure of SBC payments is another important element of governance oversight (Carlin 
and Ford, 2006: p82). 
 
6.1 Size, opportunity growth and variation in banking activities and the impact of SBC 
expense on selected performance measures 
Table (7) shows whether the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected performance 
measures varies according to banks’ size and opportunity growth rate. For both the EU and 
US samples, banks have been divided into four sub-samples, based on the quartiles of banks’ 
average total assets (a proxy for size) and market to book value (a proxy for opportunity 
growth rate). The Kruskal-Wallis test and its comparative one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) suggest that the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R on the 
selected performance measures varies significantly across banks according to their size and 
opportunity growth rate within each of the EU and US samples. Table (7) also shows that the 
material effect of mandatory recognition regime of IFRS2/FAS123R in both samples is 
noticeably confined to larger banks; the larger the bank, the more significant the impact. This 
might be intuitively due to the fact that the larger the banks, the more heavily they use SBC 
schemes. The number of granted SBC schemes is a major factor that plays a key role in 
determining the recognised expense of SBC.  Earlier studies, such as Core and Guay (2001), 
Coulton and Taylor (2002b), Melissa (2004) and Walker (2010), have found evidence that 
firm size has a positive and significant relationship with the use of SBC schemes. Another 
explanation for this finding is that employee share option-based compensations are form of 
“rent extraction” used by CEOs of large firms (Coulton and Taylor, 2002b). Needless to say, 
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vesting terms and conditions also play a key role in determining the recognised expense of 
SBC schemes. Besides, the level of operational complexity of large banks is far greater than 
that of small banks (Avraham, et al., 2012). As such, vesting conditions could also be more 
relaxed in large banks due to their greater complexity. Relaxing the vesting conditions of 
SBC schemes increases their fair value and therefore the associated SBC expense as these 
schemes will become more likely to vest. This scenario might contribute to the reason the 
effect of expensing SBC on large banks’ performance measures are more material. This raises 
an interesting issue to be investigated by future research interested in the structure and 
motivational aspects of SBC contracts and other related corporate governance issues in the 
banking industry.  
Insert table (7): The impact of SBC expense on selected financial measures (Size and Growth Effect) 
Walker (2010, p263) evaluated the adoption of CEO performance-based compensation 
packages by using a sample of high and low growth firms’ in Australia. She identified that 
the use of equity-based compensation (as a component of CEO overall compensation 
packages) is ‘positively associated with firm size and growth options. Consistent with her 
results, Table (7) shows that the impact of mandatory recognition regime of IFRS2/FAS123R 
on the selected performance measures of each of the EU and US samples is higher for high 
growth banks (the 3rd and 4th Q). The result is also in line with studies conducted in the US by 
Botosan and Plumlee (2001) and in the UK by Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010).  
The results of U test and its comparative T tests in table (7) also indicate that the impact of 
IFRS2/FAS123R on most banks’ selected performance measures after controlling for banks’ 
size and opportunity growth rate is significantly higher for US banks. The mean (median) 
impact of FAS123R on the selected measures is material for US banks with the effect 
becoming higher for larger banks.24 In the EU, the average impact of IFRS2 on the selected 
performance measures is only materially confined to large banks (the fourth quarter).  
Finally, we investigate whether the impact of SBC expensing on the selected performance 
measures also varies according to banks’ organisational structure (classification to 
commercial and bank-holding companies)25 and to the variation in the level of traditional 
banking activities of BHCs. The motivation for this analysis is that the impact of 
IFRS2/FAS123R might vary with the diversification of bank activities. Over the last few 
decades, there has been a notable movement of banks’ activities towards engaging more in 
non-traditional banking activities, such as securities underwriting and trading and selling 
insurance products (Stiroh, 2004; Avraham et al., 2012).  In this context, Becher et al. (2005) 
documented an increase in the use of SBC schemes following the deregulation of banking 
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industry. Table (8) shows that the effect of the recognised SBC expense on the selected 
performance measure varies significantly between BHCs and CBs within each block 
separately and it seems to be the highest for US CBs. It also shows that the impact of 
IFRS2/FAS123R on the majority of banks’ selected performance measures is significantly 
higher for US banks compared to EU banks after controlling for banks’ organisational 
structure. 
Interestingly, the effect for EU banks is below the corresponding materiality thresholds for 
the selected performance measures, yet it seems to be higher for banks classified as BHCs. 
To further investigate this issue, EU and US BHCs have been divided into two sub-samples, 
based on the median of banks’ average net loan to total assets as a proxy for the variation in 
traditional banking activities. The results of U and the T tests indicate that the effect of 
FAS123R on the selected performance measures for the US BHCs does not vary significantly 
after controlling for variation in traditional banking activities. For example, SBC expense 
relative to opening shareholders’ equity does not vary significantly among all US sub-groups, 
yet it is still around its traditional materiality threshold in all sub-groups. This suggests that 
the effect of expensing SBC schemes in the US sample is material in all sub-groups, 
irrespective to their organisational structure and the degree of variation in traditional banking 
activities. By contrast, the effect of IFRS2 on the selected performance measures is 
significantly higher for the EU BHCs that engage more in non-traditional banking activities. 
It is worth mentioning that diversified banking activities also imply a complex banking 
portfolio and therefore a greater tendency to use SBC schemes (Pendleton et al, 2002).  
6.2 Additional Analysis 
We also extend our analysis by controlling for the legal tradition under which the sample-
banks operate. We divided our sampled banks into banks domiciled in codified-law countries 
and banks domiciled in common-law countries. For each subsample, we also identified the 
impact of expensing SBC schemes after controlling for different characteristics of banks, 
banks’ size, and banks’ growth rate, along with banks’ operational structure or differences in 
banking activities. Earlier studies suggested that the agency problem and information 
asymmetry is more apparent in reporting environment where the institutional business 
environment and corporate governance typically focuses on firm’s shareholders because of 
the lack in the shareholder-manager direct contact (See Ball et al., 2000). As such, to alleviate 
the agency cost, agents, particularly top managements, in common-law countries, such as the 
US, UK, and Ireland, tend to rely more on SBC schemes in comparison to other countries. 
Whereas, in countries with codified legal tradition such as Germany, agents such as 
employees and managers are influential stakeholders whose pay-out is internalised to a 
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certain extent with other stakeholders. Furthermore, the advantages of closer shareholder-
manager contact in codified-law countries, making it less likely to depend heavily on SBC 
schemes. The impact of expensing SBC, therefore, is expected to be more apparent in 
common law countries compared to their codified law counterparts. Consistent with this 
view, our un-tabulated results suggest that the average effect of IFRS2/FAS123R falls above 
the materiality thresholds for all the selected performance measures only in banks that 
operate in common-law countries, and it is twice as much as for those operating in codified 
law countries. Our results are also robust after controlling for banks’ size, growth 
opportunities, and variations in banking activities. 
7. Conclusion and future research: 
This paper identifies, evaluates, and analyses the total impact of mandatory expensing of 
SBC schemes under IFRS2/FAS123R on a selected set of performance measures for a sample 
of EU and US banks, using pre and post-adoption data that covers a longer study period 
relative to prior related literature. The present descriptive research shows that, through time, 
the accounting treatment of SBC schemes following the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R has resulted in a statistically significant negative impact on the selected 
performance measures, ROE, ROA, EPS and cost to income ratio. This result supports the 
IASB/FASB argument that if SBC expense is not recognised in the income statement, the 
financial statements will provide overstated and distorted reported earnings that did not 
faithfully reflect the underlying economic reality or a ‘true and fair’ view of companies’. 
Furthermore, the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected 
performance measures seems to be material for the sample of US banks, and only for large 
and high opportunity growth banks in the EU. The material impact for US banks and for large 
and high opportunity growth EU banks is, yet still modest, indicating that earlier public 
concerns and criticisms of the implementation of this standard are largely unsubstantiated.  
In addition, the findings show that earlier predictions and employees’ fears that firms would 
curtail SBC schemes to avoid or reduce the mandatorily associated expense, came to light 
after the first option life cycle in the post-adoption period was over. Yet the decrease is 
insignificant. This suggests that banks continue to use SBC but there is a reduction, albeit 
insignificant, in the recognised SBC expense over the period 2009-2011. Finally, the findings 
also show a considerable movement towards using cash-settled based payments, possibly due 
to their flexible accounting treatment, a potential important issue for related accounting 
research and accounting standard-setters.  
17 
 
Findings of this paper can be informative to standard-setters as we put the impact of adoption 
of a highly controversial accounting standard into a global context and bench-mark two 
internationally active and peer markets that first adopted this standard. Future studies can 
provide further insight on whether the effects of IFRS2/FAS123 on financial performance 
measures vary across other industries and other countries including emerging countries that 
adopted IFRS2. Future studies might also want to extend the sample period to post 2011. 
However, based on the economic stability throughout that period26 and the lack of any 
substantive changes to either banking requirements, such as Basel or relevant accounting 
standards, it is our belief that any such research would produce consistent finding to our own. 
Another interesting issue raised in this paper is whether the complexity of banks’ operations 
influences the level of vesting conditions of SBC schemes. This issue might be of interest to 
researchers interested in the structure and motivational aspects of share-based compensation 
contracts and other related corporate governance issues. Furthermore, the response of 
companies in restructuring the compensation arrangements because of the adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R is another interesting issue for future research. Finally, our findings are a 
matter of importance for financial reporting users concerned with the extent of the changes in 
the selected financial indicators that are widely used in different contractual specifications, 
such as variable compensation contracts and in estimating firms’ value.  
 
Notes: 
1- Employee share options are the most common component of SBC packages. Hall and Murphy (2003, p. 2) defined 
employee stock options (ESOs) as “contracts that give the employee the right to buy a share of stock at a pre-specified 
“exercise” price for a pre-specified term.” 
2- Financial reporting regulations in much of Europe at that time varied from country to country, but generally, they did not 
require SBC schemes to be treated as an expense, nor was there a pro-forma disclosure requirement. For example, some 
EU countries such as the UK, only recommended firms to disclose details of shares granted to each director in the annual 
reports (Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 2010). In Italy and France, the disclosure was only limited to quantitative 
information about the number of share options and their variations during the year, without disclosing their fair value 
(See Corbella and Florio, 2010; Goh et al., 2016). It seems, in the EU, more emphasis was given to openness and 
disclosure of information than how this information would be accounted for. As a result, unlike in the US, not even pro 
forma statements by way of notes to the financial statements were required in the EU. 
3- On 19th February 2004, the IASB released IFRS2 (Share-based payments), which was first applied to accounting periods 
starting 1st January 2005. Similarly, the FASB released SFAS 123R (Share-based payments) in December 2004, as one 
of the earlier accounting standards that has been closely converged with IFRS. The standard was first applied to 
accounting periods ending in 2006 
4- This includes share options, share purchase and long-term plans and other equity awards, as well as cash-settled based 
payments where the cash payments depend on the share price. 
5- As the fair value of all share option schemes awarded after November 2002 with first vesting after 1 January 2005 were 
required under IFRS2 to be included in the charge to profits, Choudhary et al., (2009) provided evidence that firms 
accelerated the vesting condition of SOBC grants to avoid recognising expense for standing unvested grants using the 
fair value approach in the first-year adoption in their financial reporting 
6- There has been a wide variation in estimating the average reduction in the reported earnings as result of expensing SBC 
schemes. For example, Sir David Tweedie (2002), the first chair of the IASB, estimated that the average reduction in the 
reported earnings of the top 500 US companies would be between 8% and 12%, if IFRS2 had been adopted in 
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2002[Available at http://www.frc.gov.au/speeches/tweedie_speech.asp]. Apostolou and Crumbley (2005) estimated that 
the expensing of SBC in some companies such as Yahoo and Adobe would negatively affect their diluted earnings per 
share (EPS) reported in 2003 by 86% and 70%, respectively. The average reduction in Diluted EPS, for example, as 
estimated by earlier related studies, range from 22.9% (Botosan and Plumlee, 2001) to 41.19% (Street and Cereola, 
2004). It is also worth noting that these previous studies were conducted based on samples comprising firms from a wide 
spectrum of industries which might influence their results. Each industry has its own characteristics that could influence 
the potential effect of recognising share based payments expense on the key financial ratios. 
7- We believe that the period 2005-2011 is enough to capture the likely impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected 
performance measures as it covers the warranted three to five-year sample period, the period usually required to 
complete the option cycle and after which SOB expense is more likely to stabilise assuming that firms grant SBC on an 
annual basis. 
8- In the US, for example, the Congressional Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was established in 2008 to limit 
financial institutions’ tendency to offer share-based incentives in order to reduce the probability of “unnecessary and 
excessive risks that threaten their equity values.  
9- The banking industry has its unique characteristics that differ from those of other business sectors in terms of regulatory 
restrictions and their commensurate duties and responsibilities to depositors and investors. EU banks, for example are 
subject to rules set by regulatory bodies, such as the European Banking Committee and the European Banking Authority 
operated by the European Commission, and professional bodies, such as the European Banks Federation among others. 
These rules and regulations generally attempt to promote the single market particularly in the banking sector.  
10- The average impact by country was as follows: Australia 7.92%, Canada 59.34%, France 64.38%, Germany 5.63%, 
Ireland 61.38%, Japan 2.80%, and the U.K. 22.68%. 
11- There is no evidence in Schroeder and Schauer’s (2008) study about the nature of the sectors these firms belong to, 
where earlier studies predict the effect might vary extensively from one business sector to another (Street and Cereola, 
2004, p. 33; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005, p. 166).   
12- The well-established CIR has been used recently by academics and practitioners as a core measure to assess banks’ 
cost efficiency (See Hess and Francis, 2004, Beccalli et. al, 2006). According to a survey conducted by the ABA 
Banking Journal, an industrial journal published by the American Bankers Association, publicly traded banks and 
equity analysts consider this ratio an important benchmark of cost efficiency (Cocheo, 2000). Given the intuitive 
appeal of CIR as a proxy for cost efficiency, it is also relevant to examine the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R adoption on 
this ratio. 
13-   Utilising an appropriate ‘cut-off’ for testing the traditional materiality threshold is a subjective undertaking, ranging 
from approximately 0.5% to 50% (Vance, 2011). 
14-   CBs and BHCs are the main dominant structure of commercial banking industry in both sides of the Atlantic 
(Avraham, et al., 2012; ECB, 2013). Over the last few decades there has been a notable movement of banks’ activities 
towards engaging more in non-traditional banking activities such as securities underwriting and trading and selling 
insurance products (Stiroh, 2004; Avraham et al., 2012).  Changes in the regulatory environment is one of the main 
reasons that banks registered as Bank holding companies (BHCs) are allowed to expand their traditional banking 
activities, to a certain limit, and engage directly or indirectly in other related banking activities (Aharony and Swary 
1981, Avraham et al., 2012). In this paper, we also assess to what extent the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on banks’ 
performance measures vary between CBs and BHCs. 
15-   The pre-adoption year for the US sample is 2005, whereas it is 2004 for the EU sample because the mandatory IFRS2 
was first applied to accounting periods starting 1st January 2005, whereas FAS123 commenced on reporting periods 
beginning after June 15, 2005, which implies that financial reporting statements for 2006 is the first adoption year. Pre-
adoption period data is limited to one year due to the limited available disclosure in EU banks. In particular, SBC 
expense have been hand-collected from the first-year adoption comparative figures on expensing SBC packages in EU 
banks. In US banks, the pre-adoption data has been hand-collected from the pro forma disclosure in the footnotes 
attached to banks’ financial statements. 
16-   Setting the threshold of $500 million in average total assets is based on two reasons: U.S. BHCs are required to fill 
the FR Y-9C report, the most widely requested and reviewed report at the holding company level, if their total assets 
are over $500 million. This threshold is expected to increase the likelihood of finding comprehensive disclosure by our 
initial sampled EU and US banks about the recognised expense of SBC schemes as required by IFRS2/FAS123R. This 
threshold also allows us to avoid over-representing very small banks in our sample. 
17- SBC schemes, particularly share options, usually need three to five years to complete their life cycle after which the 
associated expense is expected to stabilise especially for firms that use SBC schemes annually in a steady level 
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2001). 
18-   The recognised expense of SBC packages relative to pre-tax profit exceeded the 5% of materiality threshold in 29.1% 




19-  The recognised expense of SBC schemes relative to pre-tax losses exceeded the 5% of materiality threshold in 40.83% 
of our 120 observations of banks that reported pre-tax loss (30% and 44.44% of the EU and US sample respectively) 
[untabulated result] 
20- Over the post IFRS2/AS123R adoption period, there are 763(120) bank-year observations with pre-tax profits (losses). 
Furthermore, one Irish bank would have reported a pre-tax profit rather than pre-tax loss if SBC expense was not 
recognised as an expense in 2008. Two US banks were similarly in this position in 2010 and 2011. 
21- The impact of SBC expense on ROE in percentage mirrors the impact observed on ROA; therefore we did not report 
the effect of SBC expense on ROA. Botosan and Plumlee (2001) also reported the impact of stock option expense 
observed on diluted EPS and ROA mirrors the impact on total net income, basic EPS, and E/P ratios in parentage. 
22-   IFRS2 requires all equity-settled payments awarded after 7th November 2002 and vested after the effective date of 
IFRS2 should be accounted for using the fair value method; therefore, data concerning shares granted after 7th 
November 2002 as well as not fully vested at the beginning of 2005 were collected as well. 
23- Cash-settled based payments, one type of SBC schemes, arise in transactions where a company receives services from 
its employees and incurs a liability to transfer cash, based on the value of the company shares as consideration. An 
example of liability awards is the grant of share appreciation rights (SARs) to employees, which entitle them to future 
cash payments based on the increase in the company’s share price. 
24- The average effect of expensing SBC on the selected performance measures seems to be the highest for 1st quartile of 
US banks. However, this is due to some extreme observations. The median effect also suggests the larger the bank, the 
higher the effect.  
25-   We used BankScope’s classification.  
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26- We have considered the changes in the economic environment of the countries under study over the period from 2011 
(i.e. the end of our study period) to 2017. We used three macro-economic variables: inflation, interest rate and GDP 
growth. With the exception of Greece and Ireland, the economic environment in the countries under study is relatively 
stable. Therefore, we repeat our main analysis after excluding the observations from Greece and Ireland, and our 
results still hold.   
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Tables to be ‘Inserted in the text’: 
Table (1): Sample selection, countries and observations. 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Description 
US EU Total 
CBs BHCs Total CBs BHCs Total CBs BHCs Total 
Initial Sample 20 90 110 58 28 86 78 118 196 
BHCs with less than 25% net loan to total assets  0 3 3 0 14 14 0 17 17 
Banks that do not publish annual reports in English 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 0 5 
Banks that do not grant share-based compensations over 3 years 4 0 4 22 1 23 26 1 27 
Banks with missing accounting data and market valuations 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 2 
The final sample 15 87 102 30 13 43 45 100 145 
Panel B: Countries and observations in the final sample of banks from 2004-2011 
Country CBs BHCs Total  Years-observations 
US 15 87 102 702 
EU 30 13 43 308 
United Kingdom 0 5 5 40 
Italy 6 0 6 45 
Germany 4 0 4 27 
Greece 4 0 4 19 
Spain 4 0 4 22 
France 3 0 3 24 
Netherlands 1 2 3 24 
Austria 1 1 2 16 
Belgium 0 2 2 15 
Denmark 2 0 2 15 
Ireland 2 0 2 13 
Portugal 1 1 2 16 
Sweden 1 1 2 16 
Luxembourg 0 1 1 8 
Finland 1 0 1 8 
Total 45 100 145 1 010  
 
Table (2): Descriptive statistic α 
Item/ $m 
EU (274 Observations) US (609 Observations) Total (883 Observations) 
Mean  Median S.D Mean  Median S.D Mean  Median S.D 
Total Assets 686 449.5 249 891.1 936 023.9 93 207.9 8 225.3 343 925.7 277 294.2 13 615.1 654 316.8 
Net Interest Income 8 260.2 3 847.3 12 268.2 2 397.7 256.8 8 283.3 4 216.9 402.6 10 062.2 
Net Profit  2 474.8 845.9 6 440.5 523.45 57.34 2 767.79 1 128.96 82.11 4 351.54 
Operating Income  18 087.5 8 227.7 22 394.9 4 524.1 343.2 15 824.7 8 732.9 583.8 19 164.5 
Pre-tax Profit 3 280.0 979.3 7 298.7 709.61 77.47 4 071.32 1 507.23 114.56 5 415.76 
Opening Shareholders Equity (BV) 22 716.8 10 386.9 29 304.9 7 070.5 784.7 24 859.6 11 925.6 1 211.4 27 281.4 
Market Capitalization 27 400.1 12 467.1 37 722.7 8 830.6 1 163.7 28 766.5 14 592.8 1 614.8 32 935.9 
Employee No  55 017.0 23 916.0 67 263.6 15 190.3 1 638.0 50 523.2 27 548.8 2 600.0 59 159.7 
SBC Expense 166.1 13.9 378.3 87.1 3.7 418.2 111.7 4.9 407.7 
SBC Exp/ Staff Exp b % 1.89 1.26 2.12 4.52 3.18 4.62 3.70 2.53 4.19 
α  All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined and in US currency ($) using the exchange rate at each closing period. 
b Staff expenses represent wages and benefits paid to employees and officers of the company. It includes all employee wages, fixed and 





Table (3): SBC expense relative to selected key variables α 
Item 
EU % US % Total % 
Obvs Mean  Median S.D Obvs Mean  Median S.D Obvs Mean  Median S.D 
SBC Exp Relative to Total Assets 274 0.02 0.01 0.02 609 0.06 0.04 0.06 883 0.05 0.03 0.05 
SBC Exp Relative to Adjusted Pre-tax Profit 244 3.02 1.52 4.77 519 6.12 3.50 8.08 763 5.13 2.76 7.33 
SBC Exp Relative to Adjusted Pre-tax Loss  30 6.22 0.92 9.90 90 8.57 3.87 9.69 120 7.98 3.36 9.76 
SBC Exp Relative to Opening Shareholders’ equity 274 0.51 0.23 0.75 609 0.66 0.49 0.64 883 0.61 0.42 0.68 
α All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined and in US currency ($) using the exchange rate at each closing period. 
 
Table (4): Panel (A): The impact of expensing SBC schemes on selected financial measures. 
Financial ratios b 
EU US Total 
N mean median S.D N mean median S.D N mean median S.D 
Return on equity (ROE)                         
Difference α 274 0.42 0.22 0.54 609 0.59 0.47 0.48 883 0.54 0.40 0.50 
Differences as a percentage of reported ROE c 246 3.76 1.98 5.04 519 9.55 5.06 15.02 765 7.69 3.96 12.98 
Eearnings per share (Diluted)                         
Difference 274 7.93 2.01 16.7 609 9.96 6.27 10.07 883 9.33 5.26 12.57 
Differences as a percentage of reported EPS (Diluted) c 244 4.23 2.14 5.84 508 9.32 5.31 12.63 752 7.67 4.06 11.15 
Cost to income ratio                         
Difference 274 0.64 0.38 0.75 609 1.30 0.97 1.12 883 1.10 0.77 1.06 
Differences as a percentage of reported CIR 274 1.04 0.61 1.20 609 2.12 1.61 1.77 883 1.79 1.24 1.69 
                          
Option expense as a percentage of opening shareholders’ equity 274 0.51 0.23 0.75 609 0.66 0.49 0.64 883 0.61 0.42 0.68 
α Difference is calculated as an absolute difference between used ratios adjusted for SBC expense and those reported in the annual financial reporting. The difference is measured in cents. Differences as a percentage 
is calculated as follow: ratios adjusted for SBC expense minus reported ratio and the difference is divided by reported ratio. 
b All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined. Return on equity (ROE) is calculated as net profit after tax divided by average shareholders’ equity excluding non-controlling interests. Diluted earnings 
per share (DEPS) is measured by profit attributable to equity shareholders to the weighted average numbers of shares on issue plus dilution shares. Cost to income ratio (CIR) is a bank’s operating costs relative to its 
total net interest and non-interest income (Christian, et al 2008). 
c The number of observations for reported differences as a percentage is different from that in the reported differences as absolute figures because when banks reported losses over the sample period under examination 
the observation has been omitted. Chalmers and Godfrey (2005) and Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010) also follow the same methodology. The reason being that such losses result in nonsensical percentages owing to 
the negative denominators. This follows Barber and Lyon (1996, p 394) who commented that: ‘...if ROA is negative in either year over which the percentage change is calculated, the result is nonsensical. 









Table (4): Panel (B): The impact of expensing SBC schemes on selected financial measures in the EU sample. 
Financial ratios c 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D 
Return on equity (ROE)                                                                 
Difference b 34 0.54 0.32 0.73 36 0.50 0.32 0.64 38 0.68 0.40 0.82 41 0.43 0.27 0.43 41 0.25 0.19 0.26 42 0.41 0.18 0.56 39 0.35 0.14 0.53 37 0.33 0.12 0.47 
Differences as a percentage of reported ROE  33 2.83 1.83 3.30 35 2.71 1.96 2.53 38 3.19 1.84 4.02 41 2.83 1.40 3.90 33 3.56 2.06 4.61 34 5.09 2.29 5.69 36 3.63 1.52 4.97 29 5.96 2.58 8.25 
Earnings per share (Diluted)                                                                 
Difference 34 3.91 2.70 3.85 36 8.26 3.17 15.11 38 11.09 3.82 19.12 41 6.36 3.02 6.32 41 3.75 1.49 5.39 42 9.87 1.12 23.91 39 8.92 1.08 20.53 37 7.49 1.39 17.06 
Differences as a percentage of reported EPS (Diluted) 33 3.71 2.16 4.70 35 2.99 2.23 2.72 38 3.51 2.07 4.22 41 3.00 1.68 3.99 33 3.59 2.06 4.62 34 6.60 2.83 7.53 35 4.15 1.35 6.17 28 6.58 2.71 9.40 
Cost to income ratio (CIR)                                                                 
Difference 34 0.66 0.29 0.95 36 0.65 0.53 0.56 38 0.81 0.53 0.79 41 0.65 0.37 0.65 41 0.46 0.36 0.46 42 0.57 0.38 0.65 39 0.71 0.27 1.02 37 0.68 0.28 0.97 
Differences as a percentage of reported CIR 34 1.06 0.51 1.45 36 1.09 0.82 0.99 38 1.43 0.97 1.38 41 1.13 0.68 1.14 41 0.66 0.54 0.67 42 0.87 0.55 0.96 39 1.10 0.48 1.52 37 1.04 0.46 1.47 
                                                                  
SBC expense as a percentage of opening shareholders’ 
equity 
34 0.63 0.34 0.98 36 0.58 0.32 0.73 38 0.82 0.49 1.00 41 0.58 0.37 0.77 41 0.30 0.18 0.55 42 0.55 0.22 0.80 39 0.39 0.15 0.68 37 0.34 0.12 0.57 
 
Table (4): Panel (C): The impact of expensing SBC schemes on selected financial measures in the US sample 
Financial ratios c 
2004 α 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
    n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D n mean 50% S.D 
Return on equity (ROE)                                                                 
Difference b         93 0.91 0.76 0.61 99 0.61 0.53 0.50 102 0.64 0.51 0.48 120 0.64 0.48 0.52 102 0.59 0.44 0.51 102 0.55 0.43 0.43 102 0.53 0.43 0.39 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported ROE  
        92 8.76 5.35 9.41 97 5.24 3.98 4.98 98 11.02 4.74 18.19 80 13.11 6.19 16.43 69 14.14 5.32 26.56 82 8.62 5.92 8.37 93 6.83 5.72 4.97 
Eearning per share (Diluted)                                                                 
Difference         93 13.12 10.21 10.23 99 10.22 5.82 11.82 102 10.89 6.50 10.85 102 10.93 6.72 10.44 102 9.46 6.23 9.08 102 8.78 5.91 8.47 102 9.50 6.52 9.52 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported EPS (Diluted) 
        92 8.74 5.35 9.43 97 5.21 3.80 4.97 98 11.13 4.71 18.28 79 12.70 6.04 15.69 65 11.79 5.41 14.98 78 9.25 6.04 9.09 91 7.12 5.72 5.23 
Cost to income ratio (CIR)                                                                 
Difference         93 1.93 1.31 1.71 99 1.26 1.05 1.02 102 1.53 1.08 1.37 102 1.56 1.00 1.45 102 1.18 0.86 0.96 102 1.13 0.85 0.86 102 1.16 0.95 0.81 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported CIR 
        93 3.84 2.64 3.57 99 2.23 1.73 1.84 102 2.48 1.79 2.06 102 2.36 1.60 2.04 102 1.97 1.41 1.69 102 1.84 1.29 1.46 102 1.87 1.42 1.37 
                                                                  
SBC expense as a percentage of 
opening shareholders’ equity 
        93 1.01 0.81 0.83 99 0.71 0.57 0.67 102 0.68 0.55 0.58 102 0.70 0.50 0.67 102 0.66 0.47 0.66 102 0.63 0.47 0.79 102 0.56 0.45 0.44 
α
 The pre-adoption year for the US sample is 2005, whereas it is 2004 for the EU sample because the mandatory IFRS2 was first applied to accounting periods starting 1st January 2005, whereas FAS123 commenced on 
reporting periods beginning after June 15, 2005, which implies that financial reporting statements for 2006 is the first adoption year. 
b Difference is calculated as an absolute difference between used ratios adjusted for SBC expense and those reported in the annual financial reporting. The difference is measured in cents. Differences as a percentage is 
calculated as follow: ratios adjusted for SBC expense minus reported ratio and the difference is divided by reported ratio. 
c All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined. Return on equity (ROE) is calculated as net profit after tax divided by average shareholders’ equity excluding non-controlling interests. Diluted earnings per 
share (DEPS) is measured by profit attributable to equity shareholders to the weighted average numbers of shares on issue plus dilution shares. Cost to income ratio (CIR) is a bank’s operating costs relative to its total net 






Table 5 (A): Selected performance measures with and without adjustment for SBC expense over the post and pre IFRS2/FAS123R adoption period. 
  EU Banks over the post IFRS2 adoption period (2005-2011) US Banks over the post FAS123R adoption period (2006-2011) 
Descriptions ROA α ROE α Diluted EPS α CIR PBT ROA α ROE α Diluted EPS α CIR  PBT 
Mean Adjusted 0.56 10.78 191.44 63.86 3446.14 0.67 5.83 110.57 65.34 796.72 
Mean Not Adjusted 0.54 10.36 183.51 63.21 3280.05 0.61 5.23 100.61 64.04 709.61 
T test for mean differences 
b
  14.74*** 11.36*** 5.1*** 11.2*** 7.27*** 24.5*** 26.9*** 20.7*** 20.4*** 5.14*** 
                      
Median Adjusted 0.55 11.86 105.5 61.7 996.65 0.87 8.89 107.37 63.47 82.7 
Median Not Adjusted 0.54 11.64 103.49 61.06 979.25 0.83 8.42 101.1 62.17 77.47 
WSR test for Med differences
 b
  14.06*** 13.85*** 13.67*** 13.91*** 13.75*** 21.37*** 21.38*** 21.36*** 21.37*** 21.37*** 
  EU Banks over the pre IFRS2 adoption period (2004) US Banks over the pre FAS123R adoption period (2005) 
Mean Adjusted 0.68 20.38 229.49 64.33 4134.35 1.76 14.65 213.9 56.28 1337.66 
Mean Not Adjusted 0.66 19.84 225.58 63.75 4013.85 1.65 13.74 200.78 54.35 1272.23 
T test for mean differences
 b
 4.47*** 3.78*** 1.59* 3.98*** 2.31** 8.58*** 11.39*** 10.11*** 10.52*** 2.36** 
  
     
          
Median Adjusted 0.7 16.68 103.12 61.59 1435.31 1.58 14.01 183.58 57.72 107.54 
Median Not Adjusted 0.69 16.36 100.42 61.01 1423.66 1.49 13.25 173.37 56.41 105.99 
WSR test for Med differences
 b
 5.08*** 5.08*** 5.86*** 5.1*** 5.08*** 8.37*** 8.38*** 8.37*** 8.37*** 8.37*** 
                      
Table 5 (B)
 
: The difference in the change of the selected performance measures exclusively due to the introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R 
EU Banks (2004-2005) US Banks (2005-2006) 
Descriptions ∆ROA% ∆ROE% ∆DEPS% ∆CIR% ∆PBT% ∆ROA% ∆ROE% ∆DEPS% ∆CIR% ∆PBT% 
Mean Difference in the change
 c
 (3.51) (3.49) (5.61) (1.08) (5.59) (4.89) (5.62) (5.85) (2.61) (5.45) 
T test for mean differences 
b
 3.54*** 3.47*** 3.19*** 5.63*** 1.89* 6.71*** 6.76*** 7.51*** 9.04*** 4.31*** 
                      
Median Difference in the 
change 
(2.02) (2.02) (3.21) (0.75) (1.73) (3.19) (3.8) (4.13) (1.82) (3.09) 
WSR test for Med difference
 b
 5.08*** 5.08*** 5.86*** 5.1*** 5.08*** 8.37*** 8.38*** 8.37*** 8.37*** 8.37*** 
a
 ROA, ROE and Diluted EPS are reported in cents  
b
 *, ** and *** signify significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mean adjusted ratio is the ratio after adjusting SBC expense and non-adjusted ratio is calculated from the reported amount.  
c
 The difference in the change reflects the difference in the annual change of the selected ratios without and with adjusting for options expense in the first adoption year. The reported figures represent the average difference 








: Comparison of SBC expense and SBC expense relative to staff expenses using T and U test. 
Year / Description 
SBC Exp (EU)   SBC Exp/ Staff Exp
 c
 (EU)   SBC Exp (US)   SBC Exp / Staff Exp (US)   
Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
pre-adoption 120.5 16.35 1.6 0.96 65.43 4.56 6.25 4.59 
post-adoption 166.1 13.87 1.89 1.26 87.11 3.6 4.52 3.18 
A-pre-crisis 147.9 25.24 2.07 1.52 81.94 2.95 4.63 3.29 
B-2008 122.37 8.89 1.47 1.03 83.8 3.79 4.91 3.39 
C- post-crisis 199.02 9.13 1.87 1.08 91.61 3.89 4.31 3.07 
                  
T (U) test for median (mean) differences (post vs pre-adoption)
 b
 0.81 -0.01 0.87 0.61 0.67 -1.73* -2.83*** -3.81*** 
T (U) test for median (mean) differences (pre-crisis vs pre-adoption) 0.45 0.76 1.91* 1.95* 1.01 2.04** -2.47** -2.93*** 
T (U) test for median (mean) differences (2008 vs pre-crisis) -0.41 -1.73* -3.31*** -2.63*** 0.48 0.7 0.69 0.36 
T (U) test for median (mean) differences (post-crisis vs 2008) 1.18 0.8 0.98 0.59 0.16 0.13 -1.11 1.25 
T (U) test for median (mean) differences (post-crisis vs pre-crisis) 1.02 -1.63 -0.71 -2.5** 0.26 1.09 -1.48 -0.99 
a
 This table examines whether the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R has reduced SBC expense in absolute values and relative to total staff expense in EU and US banks after divide our sample into four distinctive periods: i) 
Pre-adoption, 2004 and 2005 for EU and US banks, respectively; ii) pre-global financial crisis: from the first year of IFRS2/FAS123R adoption until 2007; iii) the global financial crisis in 2008; iv) post-global financial 
crisis, 2009-2011. Specifically, it compares between the pre-adoption and post-adoption period, pre-adoption period and pre-global financial crisis, and over the three phases of the post-adoption period (i.e. pre-global 
financial crisis, the global financial crisis and post-global financial crisis) 
b
 *, ** and *** signify significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
c 























EU Banks US banks U Test T Test 
Growth 
EU Banks US banks U Test T Test 
mean median SD mean median SD Z T mean median SD mean median SD Z T 
Earnings per share (Diluted)
 
                                     
Differences as a percentage of reported DEPS
 c
  
Q1 3.51 1.68 5.30 11.13 3.03 17.61 -4.39*** -4.22*** Q1 3.72 2.16 4.48 6.28 3.36 9.19 -2.15** -2.01** 
Q2 2.60 2.01 4.08 7.95 5.21 10.76 -6.70*** -5.23*** Q2 3.28 2.06 5.15 8.70 4.95 10.38 -6.11*** -4.66*** 
Q3 3.52 2.18 3.54 8.84 5.61 11.23 -5.07*** -4.99*** Q3 4.49 2.33 6.15 8.37 5.47 11.12 -4.51*** -3.18*** 
Q4 7.88 4.57 8.33 9.86 6.99 10.35 -2.42** -1.34 Q4 5.19 2.30 6.91 15.65 8.11 18.05 -7.53*** -6.29*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²) 
 
21.61*** 21.37***      7.88** 44.09***     
ANOVA, F -value 
 
10.75*** 4.21***      1.42** 12.64***     
Return on equity (ROE)                                   
Differences as a percentage of reported ROE 
Q1 2.91 1.69 4.02 11.87 3.05 21.36 -4.48*** -4.30*** Q1 3.21 2.06 3.74 6.67 3.26 14.26 -3.78*** -3.28*** 
Q2 2.49 1.54 4.30 7.81 4.97 10.70 -7.40*** -5.18*** Q2 3.29 1.48 5.68 9.26 4.82 13.81 -6.58*** -4.16*** 
Q3 3.36 2.09 3.31 8.58 5.50 12.80 -5.20*** -4.50*** Q3 3.74 2.22 4.51 8.53 5.46 13.15 -5.01*** -3.79*** 
Q4 6.78 4.12 7.02 10.57 6.87 14.57 -2.97*** -2.33** Q4 4.65 2.10 5.89 15.02 7.44 18.06 -8.14*** -4.56*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  22.30*** 24.34***      9.09** 44.30***     
ANOVA, F -value  9.70*** 4.22***      1.72** 7.08***     
Cost to income ratio  (CIR)                                    
Differences as a percentage of reported CIR 
Q1 0.70 0.47 0.74 2.04 1.04 2.13 -5.45*** -6.79*** Q1 0.85 0.61 0.76 1.74 1.25 1.40 -5.80*** -1.88** 
Q2 0.53 0.42 0.49 2.11 1.63 1.72 -9.32*** -10.8*** Q2 0.64 0.48 0.78 2.16 1.72 1.59 -7.80*** -9.25*** 
Q3 1.12 0.77 1.24 2.04 1.68 1.56 -5.35*** -4.66*** Q3 1.22 0.78 1.40 2.33 1.65 2.03 -5.09*** -4.81*** 
Q4 1.94 1.42 1.58 2.30 1.72 1.64 -2.04** -1.52 Q4 1.35 0.84 1.44 2.27 1.69 1.95 -4.90*** -3.81*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  42.46*** 16.60***      13.74*** 9.03**     
ANOVA, F -value  22.97*** 0.55      5.10*** 3.48**     
                    
 
                
SBC expense as a percentage of opening shareholders’ equity 
Q1 0.29 0.17 0.34 0.57 0.37 0.73 -4.29*** -3.78*** Q1 0.31 0.23 0.37 0.66 0.47 0.64 -2.84*** -5.74*** 
Q2 0.31 0.17 0.53 0.59 0.45 0.47 -6.45*** -3.98*** Q2 0.39 0.20 0.67 0.58 0.49 0.47 -5.13*** -2.02** 
Q3 0.48 0.24 0.65 0.65 0.52 0.66 -3.76*** -1.73* Q3 0.55 0.27 0.77 0.70 0.50 0.82 -3.26*** -1.35 
Q4 1.01 0.50 1.09 0.82 0.60 0.66 -0.91 1.28 Q4 0.76 0.30 0.98 0.68 0.53 0.60 -5.03*** 0.94 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  35.35*** 32.85***      15.09*** 1.27     
ANOVA, F -value  15.15*** 4.96***      5.02*** 0.95     
α
 Each of the EU and US sample banks has been divided into four separate sub-samples, based on the quartiles of banks’ average total assets (a proxy for size) and market to book value (a proxy for growth rate). 
b
 All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined. Return on equity (ROE) is calculated as net profit after tax divided by average shareholders’ equity excluding non-controlling interests. Diluted 
earnings per share (DEPS) is measured by profit attributable to equity shareholders to the weighted average numbers of shares on issue plus dilution shares. Cost to income ratio (CIR) is a bank’s operating costs 
relative to its total net interest and non-interest income (Christian, et al 2008). 
c
















EU Banks US banks U Test T Test 
mean median SD mean median SD Z T mean median SD mean median SD Z T 
Eearning per share (Diluted)
 b
                    
                
Differences as a percentage of reported DEPS  
BHCs 4.81 2.83 5.31 8.34 5.01 10.8 -3.73*** -4.42*** Less loans activities 6.14 4.16 6.56 7.81 4.69 10.35 0.99 0.22 
CBs 3.98 1.64 6.05 16.8 6.89 20.73 -6.84*** -4.66*** More loans activities 3.47 2.66 3.24 8.89 5.46 11.24 -7.01*** -6.49*** 
U test,  (Z)   3.35*** -2.92**       1.63* -1.63     
T test,  (T)   1.06 -3.07***       2.22** -1.06     
Return on equity (ROE)                   
 
                
Differences as a percentage of reported ROE 
BHCs 4.08 2.43 4.37 8.74 4.91 14.02 -4.82*** -5.64*** Less loans activities 5.42 3.94 5.16 8.31 4.69 13.82 0.49 -1.01 
CBs 3.62 1.64 5.32 15.69 6.99 20.33 -6.89*** -4.54*** More loans activities 2.71 2.02 2.83 9.20 5.29 14.24 -7.13*** -5.45*** 
U test,  (Z)   2.65*** -2.54**       2.51** -1.39     
T test,  (T)   0.71 -2.57**       2.82*** -0.68     
Cost to income ratio  (CIR)                   
 
                
Differences as a percentage of reported CIR 
BHCs 1.43 0.82 1.49 2.05 1.58 1.7 -4.60*** -3.54*** Less loans activities 2.03 1.41 1.68 1.97 1.41 1.73 -0.96 -1.44 
CBs 0.85 0.53 0.97 2.57 1.92 2.12 -7.75*** -7.25*** More loans activities 0.75 0.55 0.84 2.13 1.65 1.66 -6.18*** -4.52*** 
U test,  (Z)   2.92*** -1.53*       3.75*** -1.84*     
T test,  (T)   3.38*** -2.18**       4.66*** -1.12     
                                      
SBC expense as a percentage of opening 
shareholders’ equity 
BHCs 0.72 0.40 0.87 0.64 0.48 0.65 -1.31 0.80 Less loans activities 0.88 0.46 0.90 0.64 0.48 0.61 1.73* 2.41** 
CBs 0.41 0.20 0.66 0.75 0.57 0.61 -6.96*** -4.30*** More loans activities 0.53 0.27 0.81 0.64 0.48 0.68 -6.57*** -2.96*** 
U test,  (Z)   3.75*** -1.94*       2.17** 0.02     
T test,  (T)   2.97*** -1.66*       1.91** 0.11     
α
 All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined. Return on equity (ROE) is calculated as net profit after tax divided by average shareholders’ equity excluding non-controlling interests. Diluted earnings 
per share (DEPS) is measured by profit attributable to equity shareholders to the weighted average numbers of shares on issue plus dilution shares. Cost to income ratio (CIR) is a bank’s operating costs relative to its 
total net interest and non-interest income (Christian, et al 2008). 
b
 Differences as a percentage is calculated as follow: ratios adjusted for SBC expense minus ratio as reported in banks and the difference is divided by reported ratio. 
c
 Each of the EU and US sample banks has been divided into two subsamples according to the difference in banks’ organisational structure (classification to commercial and bank-holding companies). 
d







Have you a number for this?????: 
Eg Fig, 2 so in the text can put seeFig 2. 
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